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In this investigation, I explore the tensions which self-referentially emerge 
within our constructed ‘nature’. I begin by exploring the origins of our 
contemporary media environment as discussed by McLuhan. I then 
interrogate the challenges of digital life through a close reading of the work of 
technology critic Giles Slade. I then conclude by situating these seemingly 
competing views of mediated existence within the framework of social 
systems theory. Through the lens of social systems theory, I reframe our 
contemporary technologies as adaptations to past challenges which also 





Portable media of communication have brought human beings closer in some 
ways, albeit in others, farther apart. With the ability to transmit messages 
over vast distances, early Western civilization began a process of 
fragmentation and specialization that reached a turning point with the 
invention and mass adoption of the printing press. Encouraging uniformity 
and individualism, the printing press facilitated the distribution of knowledge 
amongst authors and readers who may have otherwise have never 
encountered each other’s ideas, while also gradually establishing boundaries 
between works of fiction, criticism, and science. While facilitating 
communication between readers and writers, the medium of print increased 
the potential physical distance between authors and readers and facilitated a 
fragmentation of previously heterogenous ideas of natural science largely in 
service of theological interests. The resulting functional boundaries of, for 
example, art and science, remained largely fixed until the emergence of new 
media environments that were subsequently erected in responses to new 
social challenges: notably telegraphy, radio, television, and most recently the 
digital environment of the internet. The global COVID-19 pandemic has forced 
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many into an unprecedented reliance on digital devices for communication 
with friends and family, to continue making a living remotely, and for 
entertainment purposes, seemingly collapsing distinctions between one’s lived 
and digital life and similarly disrupting functional boundaries of entertainment, 
reality, art, and science etc. Through consideration of Marshall McLuhan’s 
theories of media vis a vis Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social systems, I 
suggest we may observe the seeming collapse of functional systems of 
communication as symptomatic of immersion within our contemporary digital 
environment; an environment erected in response to challenges of past and 
ever contingent on those of the present and future. 
 
The work of Canadian media theorist Marshall McLuhan has often been 
contested on the basis of seemingly illogically organized arguments, his 
unconventional approaches to the study of culture through media, and 
indeed, the overall difficulty posed by works of sophistication beyond typical 
public or academic comprehension (Pressman 2014, 28). These criticisms, 
largely refuted by Paul Levinson (2000), reiterated for modern audiences by 
Alan Jacobs (2011), and shamelessly admitted by McLuhan himself in a 1969 
interview with Playboy Magazine (Rogaway 1994), indicate the effectiveness, 
if not provocative nature, of McLuhan’s often-misunderstood rhetorical 
polemics. The theories of McLuhan can most pertinently be understood as an 
examination of “the personal and social consequences of any medium that is, 
of any extension of ourselves—[and] the new scale that is introduced into our 
affairs by each extension of ourselves, or by any new technology” (McLuhan 
1964, 7). For McLuhan, any media—any technology—is a sensuous extension 
of the self; media is defined more broadly as anything that extends the 
spatial, temporal, or physical capability of human faculty (Gordon 2011, xx). 
 
On the basis that “the ‘message’ of any medium or technology is the change 
of scale or pace or pattern that it introduces into human affairs” (McLuhan 
1964, 8), McLuhan distinguishes phases in social development: tribalized 
society, the “mechanical” age, the “electric” age, and with recent scholarship 
attempting to modernize his research, the “digital age” (Logan 2010). Recent 
interpretations of McLuhan’s work explicate the relevance of these 
distinctions, explaining that, “the terms barbarian or tribal man, civilization, 
[and] electric worlds immediately evoke three different social constructs; they 
imply three different relationships between the individual and the 
environment, also denoting a different sensorial order” (Lamberti 2011, xxxi). 
If we consider, for our purposes, the Western world as a self-contained 
environment of human behaviour and necessity, and that “technological 
adaptation is specific to local environments because the problems that need 
to be solved vary from place to place” (Boyd et al. 2013, 120), new media 
become adaptations to a world reshaped by previous technological 
developments, and thus McLuhan points to a total integration of our 
environment with extensions of ourselves, suggesting “the new media are not 
bridges between man and nature: they are nature” (McLuhan 2011, 28). 
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In this investigation, I explore the tensions which self-referentially emerge 
within our own constructed ‘nature’. I begin by exploring the origins of our 
contemporary media environment as discussed by McLuhan. I then 
interrogate the challenges of digital life through a close reading of the work of 
technology critic Giles Slade. I then conclude by situating these seemingly 
competing views of mediated existence within the framework of social 
systems theory. Through the lens of social systems theory, I reframe our 
contemporary technologies as adaptations to past challenges which also 
shape our experience of the potential choices and challenges of the future.   
 
Ordering and Reordering Experience 
For McLuhan, “the spoken word involves all of the senses dramatically” in a 
simultaneous field, unlike the visual reductionism of writing, and later printing 
(McLuhan 1964, 84). The invention of writing alone could not, however, 
induce a distortion of sensuous ratios radical enough to alter existence from 
this acoustic world. Until the invention of the printing press, manuscript 
culture remained primarily an oral medium. To this effect McLuhan suggests 
that the modern reader perceives the world differently than its forerunners in 
medieval manuscript culture (McLuhan 2011, 101). Earlier, the phonetic 
alphabet itself made possible both a seemingly schizophrenic Cartesean 
perception of the world and construction of Euclydian spaces therein 
(McLuhan 2011, 7). The separation of speech from time and its re-entrance in 
space via writing represents for McLuhan “the separation of sight from the 
other senses” (McLuhan 2011, 15): ultimately, “the interiorization of the 
technology alphabet translates man from the magical world of the ear to the 
neutral visible world” (McLuhan 2011, 21). Thus, in the pre-mechanical age 
that is subsumed under the moniker the ‘Gutenberg Galaxy’, utterance is 
displaced and compressed from the diverse interplay of spaces afforded by 
unbiased sensuous perception: “the phonetic alphabet reduced the use of all 
the senses at once, which is oral speech, to a merely visual code” (McLuhan 
2011, 51). 
 
The rules of grammar and syntax govern this visual code: they are containers 
of meaning, signifiers of things both physically present and not. These 
representations allowed for the Cartesian division of mind and body. As 
McLuhan explains, “in a highly literate society... visual and behavioural 
conformity frees the individual for inner deviation. Not so in an oral society 
where inner verbalization is effective social action” (McLuhan 2011, 24). It is 
from the displaced balance of visual emphasis over all other sensuous 
experience that the literate, detribalized civilization thus emerges: one who’s 
social organization is equally bound by the effects of linearity in thought 
wrought of typographic grammar and organization (McLuhan 2011, 26-7). 
 
The printing press augmented the abstraction of the alphabet from 
simultaneous time and space. The literature created following the 
development of the printing press accordingly emphasizes a private 
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perspective, a fixed point of view. When considered in the context of the 
private consumption of printed material made possible by grammar and 
literacy juxtaposed to the interplay of senses necessary to former scribal oral 
and performative reading, a form of privatization of experience unknown to 
the centuries before the ‘Gutenberg Galaxy’ can be observed (McLuhan 2011, 
64). Representing the previously discussed shift from the world of the ear to 
the world of the eye, McLuhan asserts that “the visual makes for the explicit, 
the uniform, and the sequential in painting, in poetry, in logic, history. The 
non-literate modes are implicit, simultaneous, and discontinuous” (McLuhan 
2011, 65).  
 
Spoken aloud, the word exists in time; printed the word becomes displaced 
from time and relegates its existence solely to abstract visual space 
(McLuhann 2011, 120). The performance of manuscript involved the interplay 
of the senses in such a way that privatized reading rendered impossible; 
moreover, the codification of typographic consistency in typefaces and 
stylistic expectations enforced repeatability in keeping with linear uniformity, 
the laws of grammar, and syntax arising from typographic representation 
(McLuhan 2011, 89, 95). As McLuhan concludes, “this uniformity and 
repeatability of typographic technology, quite alien to manuscript culture, is 
the necessary preliminary to unified pictorial space and 'perspective’ 
”(McLuhan 2011, 128). A fixed point of view was thus not possible in scribal 
culture, and emerged in lieu of an “ingraining of lineal, sequential habits... the 
visual homogenizing of experience in print culture, and the relegation of 
auditory and other sensuous complexity to the background” (McLuhan 2011, 
144). With perspective came individualism, uniformity, and privacy that 
became normative, displacing the communal nature of life in the pre-
Gutenberg era (McLuhan 2011, 135). Indeed, “the invention of typography 
confirmed and extended the new visual stress of applied knowledge, providing 
the first uniformly repeatable commodity, the first assembly-line, and the first 
mass production” (McLuhan 2011, 142). It is in addition to the perspective 
granted of the medium that a newly developed, privatized consumer culture 
would place greater emphasis on authorship and authenticity as opposed to 
the collective forging of mosaic manuscript culture (McLuhan 2011, 150). 
 
In its ability to extend the temporal and geographic range of communication, 
the printing press thus imposed stricter divisions “between producers and 
consumers, and between rulers and ruled” (McLuhan 2011, 268). The collapse 
of the otherwise  necessary transgression of time and space in the 
dissemination of information indeed had radical consequences for the 
structure of society. Tellingly, McLuhan explains that: 
…the role played by print in instituting new patterns of culture is not 
unfamiliar. But one natural consequence of the specializing action of 
the new forms of knowledge was that all kinds of power took on a 
strongly centralist character. Whereas the role of the feudal monarch 
had been inclusive, the king actually included in himself all his 
subjects, the Renaissance prince tended to become an exclusive power 
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centre surrounded by his individual subjects… the result of such 
centralism, itself dependent on many new developments in roads and 
commerce, was the habit of delegation of powers and the specializing 
of many functions in separate areas and individuals (McLuhan 2011, 
12). 
 
However, with the advent of telephony, the visuality of the ‘Gutenberg 
Galaxy’—inclusive of its uniformity and specialization—seemingly collapses 
into comparably equalized unified field of sense ratios, to use McLuhan’s term. 
McLuhan describes the effects of telephonic media on culture more broadly, 
stating that: 
 
The mechanization of writing mechanized the visual-acoustic metaphor 
on which all civilization rests; it created the classroom and mass 
education, the modern press and telegraph. It was the original 
assembly-line... Gutenberg made all history Simultaneous... By 
surpassing writing, we have regained our WHOLENESS, not on a 
national or cultural but cosmic plane. We have evoked a super-civilized 
sub-primitive man (McLuhan 1969, 26). 
 
What McLuhan describes is a post-Gutenberg return to de-civilization (what 
we will later understand to be synonymous with “de-differentiation”). Though 
paradoxical, there is justification for McLuhan’s seemingly vehement point 
and terminology. Similar to the intentionally mosaic like structure employed 
in this essay, the book which influenced it, McLuhan’s Gutenberg Galaxy 
monograph, itself posits a “parody of print technology,” specifically one that 
has “[impoverished] the integration of the five senses by privileging the eye 
alone.” This is carried out not as an attack on the effects of book culture, but 
instead is suggested to provide an alternative: the reintegration of senses, 
once lost to visual bias, rendered possible in the “post-Gutenberg era” 
(Gordon 2011, viii). W Terrence Gordon suggests that “many commentators 
radically misread McLuhan as intending to hasten the collapse of book 
culture… [though he] explicitly states that retaining book culture can only be 
done by avoiding the errors of the past” (Gordon 2011, viii). These errors of 
course lie in the inability of society to adapt to the alterations of sense ratios 
induced by new media, especially as “competitive individualism had become 
the scandal of a society long invested with corporate and collective values” 
(McLuhan 2011, 12). As we have seen, writing wrought from speech produced 
“effects in social and cultural organization that endure to the present.” 
However, “the powerful extension of speech permitted by the development of 
radio produced a similar loss, for this medium reduced speech to one sense – 
the aural” (Gordon 2011, xvii).  
 
Returning to my opening commentary McLuhan’s research is – in some circles 
– conventionally disputed. Yet, The Gutenberg Galaxy intentionally sets 
forward: 
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…the expression of insights through aphorisms and a mosaic structure 
of presentation, the expectation that readers will make their own 
discoveries, an abhorrence of the debilitating effects of the specialist 
knowledge, a concern with the power of form to alter the action of 
other forms, the identification of cultural patterns in their physichic 
and social dimensions on the basis of a society’s dominant technology, 
and, above all, a refusal to present ideas with any concession to the 
expectation of readers (Gordon 2011, xii). 
 
Through McLuhan’s unorthodox rhetorical organization he “[awakens] 
us and alerts us to the  difficulties of grasping the long-term effects of 
all technological innovations on our senses and on our realities” 
(Gordon 2011, viii). By confronting us with a mosaic intended as 
complete sensuous immersion, McLuhan evokes literacy wrought of 
the Gutenberg era while simultaneously immersing us in the world of 
sound abandoned in its wake: this electric world of sound indeed 
representing a partial return to the simultaneous field of sensuous 
ratios experienced in non-literate civilization. For McLuhan, the new 
media “reconfigure our world in the form of a global village,” and it is 
within this context that in our embrace of mediated communication we 
return to the sort of non-literate social organization, devoid of 
specialization, found in the eras preceding the ‘Gutenberg Galaxy’. 
McLuhan describes the telephone as “speech without walls,” the 
phonograph as “music without walls,” and the movie, radio and 
television as “classroom without walls” (McLuhan 1964, 309).  
 
Indeed, “all the new media, including the press, are art forms which 
have the power of imposing, like poetry, their own assumptions. The 
new media are not ways of relating us to the old ‘real’ world; they are 
the real world and they reshape what remains of the old world at will” 
(McLuhan 1969, 23). We may then locate the criticisms of McLuhan in 
the noted strain and psychological stress the philosopher himself 
observes in the transitional period between dominant media. Where 
the “global village” entails unprecedented communicative possibilities, 
larger trends in socio-cultural evolution amplify the tensions noted as 
well as unanticipated social consequences. 
 
Giles Slade, for instances, reminds us that “long before portable 
devices like the transistor radio (1954) or the Walkman (1979) began 
insulating us simply by shutting out unwelcome noise in public 
contexts and making us socially inaccessible, there was the comfort, 
isolation, and safety of the car” (Slade 2012, 55). Slade suggests that 
“driving alone had become a distinctly American pastime, but being 
alone and in silence for prolonged periods was difficult for city dwellers 
who wanted shelter from the cacophonous and distracting soundscape 
of heavily metallic modernity” (Slade 2012, 63). Slade further 
emphasizes that “heaters and other gradual improvements in the 
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closed environments of automobiles made the car an extension of 
America’s living space, a private sanctuary on the public thoroughfare” 
(Slade 2012, 61). The automobile became a means of mediated 
technological isolation no different than the iPod of the early-aughts 
(Bull 2012, 198) and modern smartphone culture: seclusion became 
both a normative and necessary side effect of urbanization, a 
technological adaptation. But an adaptation to what?  
 
Social Atomization 
In general, technology not only extends our nervous systems, but effectively 
the distance between us regardless of function. As Giles Slade states: 
…in the early twentieth century, emerging technologies of 
consumerism reduced the number and length of human interactions 
while providing a variety of substitutes for human company, and that 
as this process continued, it was increasingly characterized by positive 
feedback. Isolation became increasingly worse as we relied 
unconsciously on new technologies to ameliorate isolation (Slade 
2012, 66). 
 
Indeed, “the trend toward eliminating human interactions for reasons of 
speed, efficiency, cost, or stress reduction began during the wave of 
urbanization that followed the Civil War” (Slade 2012, 27). However, in what 
ways were these interpersonal schismatic social practices effected? Slade 
reminds us that with respect to human interaction: 
…the city introduces a fundamental problem – volume – into the 
neurological structure of human trust. We may simply be inadequately 
equipped “psycho-bio-chemically” to interact successfully with so many 
people so often… the size of our neocortex actually limits the 
maximum size of our human social universe to about 150 people, the size 
of a big Neolithic village… among city dwellers, therefore, there is a 
problem of how to keep so many strangers out (Slade 2012, 227). 
 
Mechanized mass-production instigated during the Great Depression found its 
inspiration in archaic forms of vending technology, amidst other earlier 
practices (Slade 2009, 66). Vending technology, a replacement of a human 
role, represented for the Americas an early step towards both mechanical 
reliance and the disintegration of interpersonal contact. After centuries of 
conditioning, “we came to accept machines as viable alternatives to human 
company” (Slade, 2012, 192). The practical social consequences displaced 
faith in fellow human beings, instilled trust in mechanical replacements, and 
“reliability and accuracy became qualities increasingly associated with (and 
desired from) machines as human trust became increasingly more 
abstract”(Slade 192). We will return later to the concept of “trust” later in the 
discussion. For the moment, of note is the fact that the ingrained values of 
the ‘Gutenberg Galaxy’ lie at the basis of societal atomization through 
mediated interaction. 
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Amusements providing specifically privatized entertainment also emerged 
during the first half of the twentieth century. As noted, technology is 
developed in response to the environment, a means of adaptation (Lacey: 
2012, 118). In response to the clamour of urbanity, solitary and privatized 
listening practices can be observed as far back as the 1890s (Lacey: 2012, 
117-18), with discursive references occurring in literature published after 
1932 (Slade: 2012, 77). The automobile is indeed both a catalyst and 
exponent of this history of privatized listening. Where it initially functioned as 
a means to both navigate and escape urbanity, Slade suggests “this 
transformation in American sociability is uniquely tied to the growth of cities 
where human contact became a source of stress that exceeded personal 
control” (Slade 2012, 66). The car radio—indeed, the atomized environment 
of the automobile itself—was, of course, at the driver’s control. For McLuhan 
technology extends humanity’s inborn faculties, whereas for Slade this 
extended existence also entails societal fragmentation. The uniformity of the 
‘Gutenberg Galaxy’ however further transcended thought processes and 
became residually reflected in the very organization and normative values of 
society. 
 
Adoption of mass production in North America—Fordism—dates to 
approximately the mid-nineteenth century; however by the closing decades of 
the century, previously established practices of interchangeable component 
production had been replaced by the concept of standardization (Slade 2012, 
191). In the same way that typography produced the first marketable, mass 
produced commodity, widespread “adoption of interchangability had profound 
economic significance, but it was much more significant culturally because it 
facilitated the emergence of mass... consumer culture” (Slade 2012, 186). 
Identical, interchangeable, and modular mass production intersects with 
Gutenberg values foremost in uniformity. However, since the origins of “the 
American System of Manufacture/Production” lie in the creation of specialized 
components of an overall product, the specialization of knowledge afforded by 
the Gutenberg perspective carries as well through in Slade's story of 
technology and loneliness (Slade 2012, 187). 
 
The preceding decades of urbanization set precedent for the sort of mediation 
that became normative in the urban realm. As the concept of reliability 
overtook conventional notions of trust, facilitated by economic concerns that 
produced reliable machines, society took to the forms of mediated interaction 
as above quoted from Slade. Our relationship with these technologies, 
however, takes on a considerably different form when we consider that: 
 
Since the discovery of mirror neurons in the 1980s, neuroscience has 
repeatedly shown that individual human beings are transitive verbs 
always in search for direct connections with human objects. We are 
neurally programmed to complete ourselves only in genuine 
relationships with other human beings. But our programming is so 
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powerful and so deeply embedded in the primate fabric of our brains 
that when the possibility of same-species relationships are absent from 
our lives, we compulsively invent substitutes out of whatever animate 
or inanimate material is at hand (Slade 2012, 23). 
 
Thus, as we surrounded ourselves by technology, it became a surrogate to 
the humans displaced by its presence: “as we moderns lost the habit of 
trusting others, the activity of trusting became more fraught and less 
frequent, and we relied on distractions and divers to deflect the emptiness of 
an untrusting world” (Slade 2012, 175). The effects of urbanization thus left 
city-dwellers “paranoid” of interaction, and those left behind in the rural realm 
remained both geographically and physically as well as “psychologically” 
isolated (Goodman 2010, 27). As Goodman demonstrates, “the always-on 
[radio] itself became a companion imbricated in their lives, not a voice from 
outside to be rationally assessed” (Goodman: 2010, 25). The isolated listener 
of the radio, phonograph, the iPod or iPhone, or today the solitary academic 
on endless Zoom calls is thus isolated in a sonic realm with the comforting 
accompaniment of sonic connection in place of typical interaction.  
 
In the 1930s radio manufacturers began promoting individualized listening, 
“[dividing] the domestic space into individualized zones of reception,” which 
in turn became the norm in the years following the war with the lower price of 
a radio unit as afforded by refined mass production technology (Russo 2010, 
175-178). Radio then created a controlled reality within a confined space. In 
fact, some early recorded broadcasts had misled listeners to believe what 
they were hearing was being broadcast live (Russo 2010, 88). The now 
infamous War of the Worlds broadcast staged by Orson Welles is a case in 
point. Whether in the solitary confinement of the automobile, or in the equally 
private spaces of the home, privatized listening gradually became the norm of 
musical consumption (Slade 2012, 79). Pre-war limitations on fidelity fostered 
a belief that, wherever the origin of the broadcast, the performer(s) were 
indeed engaged in live music directly transmitted to the receiver, fostering a 
sense of intimacy and connection with the radio-surrogate “friend” (Slade 
2012, 79). However, prior to WWII, 43% of radio broadcasting was pre-
recorded (Russo 2010, 79). Transcription processes, initially culminating with 
Orson Welles’ War of the Worlds, “showed that the elimination of the 
distinction between image and reality has already advanced to the point of a 
collective sickness” (Adorno 1991, 56). In a less judgmental vein, we may 
assume that the reliability placed in machines transcended the trust once 
placed in other human beings evidently to the point of misguided faith. 
 
Thus, historically, devices like the radio provided a means of connection with 
reliable sources that displaced human company. In contrast, while “the 
satisfaction provided by the telephone is essentially [a] responsive, two-way, 
device… broadcast radio was an entirely one-way device” (Slade 2012, 70). In 
lieu of diminished personal interaction, and with respect to Slade’s discussion 
of mirror neurons earlier mentioned, we thus develop parasocial relationships 
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with the stars of the screen and radio. They become a source of comfort as 
the voice of the machine (Slade 2012, 89). Prior to the emergence of 
electronic media, celebrity culture persisted but in a slightly differing guise. 
Today, emphasis is placed on the personal life of the distant celebrity in an 
attempt to foster a more realistic sense of connection: “such parasocial 
relationships were reinforced by the emergence of movie studios [in the early 
20th century]… but the first media star was actually a singer who rarely 
appeared in films” (Slade 2012, 90). This represents the first instance of the 
sort of parasocial relationships hereto described and replaced with mediated, 
reliable sources; “relationships” which in turn logically extended to stars of 
the screen. These parasocial relationships, a result of the anxieties 
experienced amidst urbanization and mechanization, also participated in 
“transforming the experience of listening from a participatory group activity to 
a more sedentary [and] often solitary one,” reliant upon the parasocial 
relationship created with the media star (Slade 2012, 139). As modern 
celebrities became a source of comfort in the midst of post-Civil War 
mechanization and urbanization, “stories about stars increased people’s 
fascination for them and created a demand for more stories and for more 
appearances of the star on disc or on film. These stories became increasingly 
intimate as the illusion grew that the audience knew these people as 
intimately as real friends” (Slade 2012, 143): whether stars of radio or 
screen, both became the voice of parasocial, mechanical company, somewhat 
akin to the role of the modern educator amidst the sea of blank screens 
constituting the Zoomer online classroom. 
 
Essentially, “the illusion of proximity and warmth that all music perpetuates 
has been the objective of all manufacturers of pre-recorded music. For lonely 
hominins (including modern men and women), music is distance grooming” 
(Slade 2012, 149). Prior to the commodification,mechanization, and 
digitalization of music – dating to the earliest instances of bi-pedalism, – 
“vocal music began as a fundamentally interpersonal and communicative 
activity” (Slade 2012,102), with music more broadly serving as a communal 
activity intended to promote social cohesion (Slade 2012, 104). 
Social cohesion, regardless of media or social constructs, is achieved at the 
bioneurological level. Slade explains that: 
When human beings bond – by hugging, kissing, touching, having sex, 
eating together, giving massages, or even when singing together or 
speaking reassuring words – oxytocin brings us “in 
from the cold,” warming us – quite literally – as it redirects blood flow 
into hands, feet, chests, and cheeks. We also become temporarily less 
‘frigid’ since, as we enjoy moments of ‘human warmth,’ each 
successful social interaction stimulates our dopamine receptors, 
encouraging (most of) us to seek more company and to become more 
trusting (Slade 2012, 225). 
 
However, displaced social interaction rendered “machines… faster, better, and 
more reliable than human beings who were sometimes clumsy and inaccurate 
10
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but who were, more often, completely and utterly untrustworthy. It was also 
the reliability of these early machines that led to the practice of ‘branding’ 
consumer products” (Slade 2012, 119-20). Thus, as technological reliance 
and mediation increased in tandem with the engrained values of uniformity, 
repeatability, and individuality of the ‘Gutenberg Galaxy’, we adapted to 
become less social and allowed technology to mediate our personal 
interaction, and indeed forged new relationships with this technology in lieu of 
typical human interaction. But what of McLuhan’s enthusiasm for the 
simultaneous field of experience re-emergent in the electric age? Bodily 
production of oxytocin is not provoked by typographic technology, nor by 
even modern modifications to such media – the letter, email, or text message 
for instance. However, recorded music, phone calls, and seemingly any sonic 
event fulfills Slade’s criteria of “distance grooming,” events which inhibit the 
production of the hormone (Slade 2012, 106).  
 
At the physiological level it is clear that as afforded by typographic 
technology, mediated communication prohibits essential neuro-biological 
responses to human interaction and indeed promoted adaptation to renewed 
social norms both effecting and catalyzing societal atomization (Slade 2012, 
106). McLuhan pondered, “if the work of the city is remaking or translating of 
man into a more suitable form than his nomadic ancestors achieved, then 
might not our current translation of our entire lives in to the spiritual form of 
information seem to make of the entire globe, and of the human family, a 
single consciousness?” (McLuhan 1964, 67). The sort of meta-community 
McLuhan describes seems abundantly realized in the 21st century, where 
“specialism” is disintegrating in academia. Moreover, “mash-up culture” has 
begun to question concepts of authorship and authenticity much akin to that 
of medieval manuscript culture (Lamberti 2011, xxxviii). Nevertheless, 
atomized faith in mechanized and digitized culture still provides a mediated 
barrier between the individual and the outside world, as well as company in 
the absence of conventionally understood reality. 
Similarly indebted to our natural adaptation and replacement of human 
company with various mediating devices, “human trust is hardwired into our 
neurological machinery via the mirror neurons that were discovered in the 
1990s and through the strange chemical, both hormone and 
neurotransmitter, oxytocin, about which we know so little” (Slade 2012, 161). 
Slade refers to the alterations to these neuro-biological processes 
sociologically as a distinction between “traditional and modern trust” (Slade 
2012, 167). Modern trust, as Slade perceives, is based in the reliability of our 
technologies, and in explanation directs us to: 
 
Niklas Luhmann [who] noted that in modern societies, social order no 
longer depends on the personal version of trust that characterized 
small, traditional societies like the assortment of communities that 
comprised the American South in the decade before the Civil War. 
Instead, Luhmann proposed larger, less personal societies encourage a 
kind of abstract “system-trust,” which also reduces social complexity – 
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once again – by raising our tolerance for (the) uncertainty of future 
outcomes (Slade 2012, 166). 
 
Slade claims that modern or system-trust “is ground zero for our 
contemporary isolation and reliance on technology. As modernism evolved, 
kinship relationships and the homogeneity and 
traditions of long-established local communities were replaced by the fleeting 
partnerships of heterogeneous urban dwellers” (Slade 2012, 173). 
Accordingly, we replaced trust in people with reliance on machines. 
Considering “it is the ongoing purpose of human trust to reduce social 
complexity by raising our tolerance for (the) uncertainty of future outcomes” 
(Slade 2012, 166), a culturally engrained belief in the normativity of 
uniformity and specialism promoted a “kind of modern trust [that] is involved 
in elaborate forms of economic cooperation, and it leads to a surge in 
professionalization since the professions exist mainly to provide confidence in 
the judgement and actions of unknown (and interchangeable) individuals” 
(Slade 2012, 167).  
 
Indeed, Luhmann concurs that “trust is based on a cognitive process which 
discriminates among persons and institutions that are trustworthy, distrusted, 
and unknown” (Lewis et al. 1985, 970). Here I have striven to demonstrate 
that the alterations to culture noted by McLuhan are indeed pragmatically 
present in society more broadly and indeed reflect the beliefs McLuhan held 
regarding the effect of new media on social organization. Moreover, as faith in 
the individual perspective historically took grasp, “gradually secular 
organizations replaced religion as the primary means of organizing and 
stabilizing human relationships across time. Increasingly, too, these 
relationships were monetized and hence subject to free-market competition” 
(Slade 2012, 176). We may localize these considerations of cultural 
community and loneliness within a macrolevel consideration of society more 
broadly. Indeed, “the necessity of trust can be regarded as the correct and 
appropriate starting point for the derivation of rules for proper conduct,” the 
rules which in turn govern the formation of social systems (Luhmann 1979, 
4). 
 
Social Systems: Adaptation and Evolution 
Contemporary faith in technology, as the preceding section demonstrates, 
finds its origins in the ‘Gutenberg Galaxy’, carries through the mechanical 
age, and has become subject to alteration and more widespread reliance in 
the electric and digital ages as a result of the necessity forged from/in the 
prior eras. As Slade tells us, we may consider technological reliance an 
extension of reliance upon standardization and specialization (Slade 2012, 
173). In addition to explaining the alterations of trust Slade refers to, the 
epistemological framework set forward by social systems theory can also 
“iLuhmannate” the social structures that foster and support modern trust. 
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Here we cast our glance to the sociocultural ramifications of new media and 
their implications in what Luhmann refers to as “functional differentiation.” 
First, it seems necessary that we examine Niklas Luhmann’s somewhat 
laborious notion of society more broadly before exploring sub-systemic 
specifics. Recent interpreter Hans Georg-Moeller explains that: 
  
…as opposed to the traditional Old European attempt to describe 
society on the basis of its members (that is: a group of people or a 
community), systems theory tries to describe society on the basis of 
its events: it looks at what actually happens... [for example] when 
someone watches TV, this is understood as mass media 
communication; and when a vote is cast and counted, this is 
understood as political communication. These examples already show 
that communication is not restricted to language; often one can 
communicate equally well, for instance, with money or ballots (Moeller 
2006, 6).  
 
Each of these operations and functions thus demonstrates specialized forms 
of communication accomplished with equally specialized media organized in 
what Luhmann describes as systems of communication. Luhmann’s point of 
departure is the development of specialized forms of communication and their 
reliance upon previously established communication systems, forming “self-
referential systems” (Luhmann 1995 12-3). “Self-reference,” the foundation 
of the formation and perseverance of social structures, is the means by which 
a system both reproduces itself as well as differentiates itself from its 
environment. It describes the emergence and perseverance of a 
communication system’s future as dependent upon past preserved and 
established practices and norms (Luhmann 2012, 29).  
 
In short, science becomes and continues to be science; law continues to be 
law based on previously set precedents. Self-reference, however, is but a 
means of organization and distinction and thus cannot claim complete 
independence from other social systems on behalf any one in particular. In 
order to understand the intersections of systems rendered operationally 
closed by self-reference, we turn to Moeller’s description of functionally 
differentiated society. Succinctly explaining Luhmann’s elaborate and 
extensive claim, he states: 
 
…all subsystems form the environment of the others. The economy 
exists in the midst of all other function systems, and the same is true 
for those as well. Operationally closed systems can, by virtue of their 
operational closure, observe and “resonate” with their environment. By 
closing themselves off, social systems develop a “membrane” that 
allows them to distinguish themselves from their environment and to 
relate to it. By being differentiated from their environment, social 
systems are not only capable of self-reference, but also of other-
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reference. They can – within their operational boundaries – make the 
environment an issue and refer to it (Moeller 2006, 35). 
 
Structural coupling, simply put, is the observation of one system by others in 
its environment (Luhmann 2012, 55). That is to say, for example, economics 
observes music. The purchase of an album, or attendance at a concert, 
requires economic communication inasmuch as the experience becomes a 
form of musical, or more broadly, artistic communication. Artistic production 
is of course highly dependent on economic systems. Accordingly, Luhmann 
explains that autopoiesis, the mechanism of systemic self-reference and self-
replication, “is in the first place the generation of indeterminacy within the 
system, which can be reduced by the system itself forming structures.” He 
elaborates that “the system can constitute operations of its own only further 
to operations of its own and in anticipation of further operations of the same 
system” (Luhmann 2012, 33). That is to say, for example, when poetry is 
composed language becomes the medium of art, a component of its 
environment. Language no more constitutes poetry inasmuch as poetry is not 
typical lingual communication: it develops its own forms within the 
boundaries of system and environment formed of observation and 
communication, organizing potential understanding and reciprocation of 
communication. It’s distribution, is however no differently dependent on 
economic systems of consumption than that of musical composition and 
performance. Poetry itself, however, becomes poetry by observing prior 
communications of the art system—specifically poetry—as well as comments 
on its environment through “hetero,” or “other-reference” (Luhmann 2013a, 
56). Other-reference is the reference to other subsystems beyond the 
operational closure that Moeller described above. For Luhmann, “modern 
society is characterized by the functional autonomization and operational 
closure of its more important subsystems” (Luhmann 2012, 17). What this 
suggests is that modern society is governed by functional, specialized, closed 
modes of communication mirroring and preserving the earlier described 
effects of typography.  
 
Where “society has evolved to a state in which it consists of a variety of large 
communication systems that can be identified by the functions they perform… 
for instance, economy, politics, law, and mass media” (Moeller 2006, 24), 
Luhmann explains that “the stability of functional systems and of the 
organizations, professions, and roles differentiated within them on the 
principle of the division of labour is compatible with a wide range of variations 
and selections” (Luhmann 2013b, 296). What this suggests is that the 
availability of information provided by the emergence of the mass media in 
the wake of the printing press provided less restricted opportunities to inform 
necessary selections amidst newly generated social complexity: “in the older 
order, political government seemed to be the order of society itself” 
(Luhmann 2013b, 69). Divorced from direct imposition of authority, public 
opinion could then emerge through communicative capabilities afforded by 
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container technology: as we saw earlier, the printing press became a 
reciprocal conduit of communication between author and audience. 
 
Accordingly, with the breakdown of social stratification—referring to hierarchal 
social organization extant in the eras prior to the Gutenberg Galaxy—and 
replacement with functional differentiation (Moeller 2006, 42), instantaneous 
dissemination of information made possible observation of functional systems 
by every other system within the larger environment (Moeller 
2006, 25). As outlined, operational closure draws the distinctions between 
these systems: art is not economics, science is not law. This is the 
quintessential determinant between the eras prior to and perhaps following 
the Gutenberg Galaxy. Feudal, hierarchal organization drew fewer distinctions 
between the roles of religion, law, or for that matter, art. Though “function 
systems are operationally closed [this] does not mean that they do not 
influence each other. Politics certainly influences the economy – and vice 
versa. All social subsystems thus “influence” each other in various degrees” 
(Moeller 2006, 36). 
 
Autopoiesis, the mechanism of operational closure, relies on the concepts of 
observation and distinction and “within this distinction the system (not the 
environment) is defined as the author of selections, and distinctions, [which] 
like indications, are performed as operations of the system itself” (Luhmann 
1995, 167). What could this mean for music (or for that matter, art), for 
example? Essentially, music differentiates itself from science; law from 
economics etc. However, these systems may observe their environment: 
music can respond to politics just as economics observes and depends upon 
law. Musical structure, theory, etc., nevertheless are observed and persevere 
in building upon prior foundations. Luhmann expands his gaze more broadly 
suggesting that “the social world is made up of observations (communications 
of distinctions) that open up a space, and observations of the latencies of 
other operations, each enabled by a further latency exposed to observational 
scrutiny” (Rasch 2002, 25). In this sense, systems are forced to make 
selections amidst complexity; selections that in turn generate further 
complexity.  
 
The simplification of autopoiesis presented succinctly explains the mechanism 
by which art, science, etc., generate the form and structure of their 
communications, and thus collectively constitute the environment of the 
larger communication system of modern society itself (Luhmann 2012tos, 
50). The question remains, where do we locate the “human” in Luhmann's 
conception of society in which it is “communication that constitutes 
communication”? Simply put, human beings are “necessary for 
communication to take place” (Moeller 2006, 8).  
 
Current interpreters of Luhmann's work suggest “reality, then, is not a 
pattern of objects but an account of such a pattern” (Rasch 2000, 15-16). 
Accounts of such patterns of communication thus require cognition by actors 
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within the system of society. However, “systemically speaking, a theory that 
conceives of society as the system of communication has to locate minds and 
bodies—and, of course, “human beings”—outside the operational realm of 
society” (Moeller 2006, 9). Thus, with “the traditional notion of the ‘human 
being’ [as] a simplification of the actual complexity of human existence,” we 
must recognize that “human beings exist as much bodily as they exist 
mentally and socially” (Moeller 2006, 11).  
 
Essentially,by excluding minds and bodies from society, systems theory 
establishes three main types ofsystems: systems of communication (social 
systems), systems of life (bodies, the brain, and so on), and systems of 
consciousness (minds). Each system is the environment of others. 
Communication needs the environment of living and psychic systems, just as 
a fish needs water. But this is also true vice versa: to be a system, a system 
must have an environment (Moeller 2006, 9). 
 
The observer thus “observes other systems by means of the distinction 
between system and environment:” the environment in this case is accessible 
only by a priori cognition of previously observed systems (Luhmann 2013, 
107). This is to say one does not know what art could be without making a 
distinction between art and – for example – science (or having that distinction 
explained). Understood from this perspective, society may be regarded as the 
interaction of various systems – including people as above defined – each 
effecting the other in varying degrees. Regardless of physical or mental 
isolation, the human subject remains part of the environment of society. 
 
Luhmann explains that “an observer can describe the complexity descriptions 
of another observer, so that hypercomplex systems can come into being that 
also contain a plurality of complexity descriptions; and it should be clear that 
hypercomplexity is an autological concept” (Luhmann 2012, 80). The 
observer is of course themself a system; more specifically, a set of 
structurally coupled systems: mental, physical, and social. Indeed, “limits on 
capacity generally force systems of every kind to reduce complexity, to 
simplify themselves, and to realize their possibilities only selectively” 
(Luhmann1995, 337). Furthermore, “any determination of action 
requires a simplification, a reduction of complexity” (Luhmann 1995, 166). 
 
Trust is a mechanism of this reduction process. Systems of communication 
organize information and codify it in appropriate media. The determinant 
factor in what is defined as “appropriate” is what we may understand as a 
social system. Reliance on technology, uniformity, and specialization more 
broadly is attributed by Slade to the foundation of modern trust: a form of 
trust which extends to the professionalization – and thus, specialization – of 
functions within functionally differentiated society. Within the residual bounds 
of Gutenberg sensibilities, someone who creates art is henceforth an artist; a 
scholar of science is indeed a scientist. At least they were. 
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Conclusions 
It is selection amidst complexity —in this case referring to any given decision 
that generates or mandates any form of communication—which in turn 
generates information and creates further complexity over the course of time 
(Luhmann 1995, 47). We may call the totality of this complexity modernity: 
for every distinction made one generates new forms of complexity —new 
problems to be encountered by systems of the present and future. The 
selections made within it by individual actors are those in turn which force 
subsequent selections of other actors, and any communication becomes “an 
examination of the structure of modernity that both dictates… observations 
and emerges as a result of them” (Rasch 2000, 1-3). Within the context of 
SST, observation and communication within systems become operations of 
selection: a communication selected amidst complexity. This is not only the 
process by which systems develop form and structure, but emerge similarly to 
“evolutionary selection... occurring out of the environment” (Luhmann 1995, 
32).  
 
Technological adaptation, as we have seen, has origins and ramifications in 
both history and social necessity that can be “explained only in terms of 
responsiveness to the social environment, a demand for and use of the 
technology” (Luhmann 2012, 316). Functional differentiation is a result of this 
demand and use. As previously mentioned, one such functional system is that 
of art. Art for Luhmann is a sort of transcendental conception, that which 
differentiates itself by virtue of it being art—the system observes prior art at 
a level akin to second-order cybernetics which in turn structures subsequent 
artistic communications (works of art). Simply put, artistic production 
“presupposes and builds on the [observations previously made]” (Luhmann 
2000b, 67). For Luhmann a work of art differentiates itself from something 
other than art simply by virtue of it being art: an aesthetic communication 
separate from conventional reality (Sevänen 2001, 90). Nearly any 
communication that proclaims itself to be art is seen through the lens of SST 
as art, including radio broadcasts (Luhmann 2000b, 22).  
 
This commentary becomes revelatory as recent trends in sociology suggest 
that Luhmann’s structural appraisal of the functional differentiation of society 
is in peril with respect to globalization, in fact in the midst of “de-
differentiation” (Sevänen 2001, 83). Here we return to our previous 
discussions to remind the reader that in the electric age McLuhan foresaw a 
return to the simultaneous field of sensuous experience experienced in pre-
literate culture. A structural decomposition of functional differentiation 
indicates validation of this in that the specialism of the Gutenberg Galaxy too 
is beginning to decay in response to modern media technology.  
 
The example of a radio broadcast becoming art is of particular relevance. For 
Luhmann, the mass media system is comprised of entertainment, advertising, 
and news reporting (Luhmann 2000b). Art can of course be broadcast, but 
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the distinction between art/entertainment, documentary, and in some ways 
advertising becomes distorted as contemporary audience’s perception of 
‘reality’ becomes blurred by the technicality of the paradigm of digital 
reproduction more broadly. 
 
Luhmann distinguishes within the system of mass media “all those institutions 
of society which make use of copying technologies to disseminate 
communication. This means principally books, magazines and newspapers 
manufactured by the printing press, but also all kinds of photographic or 
electronic copying procedures, provided that they generate large quantities of 
products whose target groups are as yet undetermined.” He stresses that “the 
crucial point at any rate is that no interaction among those copresent can 
take place between sender and receivers” (Luhmann 2000b, 2). We have 
seen how technology responds to, and in turn, shapes its environment. 
Technology is then subsequently developed in response to the environment: a 
means of adaptation (Lacey: 2012, 118). Alfred Kuhn calls this “adaptive 
behaviour,” specifically describing the “behaviour of a system in an 
environment,” dependent on the state of both the system(s) in question and 
those of their environment (Kuhn 1974, 38). The emergence of mass media 
communication, dating to the printing press and carrying through its residual 
biases in the digital age, served social functions in extending the reach of the 
human voice but in turn, as Slade observes, gradually replaced dependance 
on other people and replaced that trust in machines; machines which in the 
digital age, for example, Zoom, overcome the boundaries of the ‘Gutenberg 
Galaxy’ by allowing for simulated visual and sonic communication. Where 
direct contact is prohibited between sender and receiver, a residual 
Gutenberg value amplified by the necessity of the global pandemic, we have 
gradually adopted our digital world as a natural environment as a result of our 
circumstances. Moreover, as we delve deeper into our contemporary digital 
world not only can the lines between, for example, art and mass media 
become blurred in light of noted de-differentiation of functional systems, but 
also calls into the question the differentiation of artist, educator, etc and 
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